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Abstract 
The paper argues that science assessment should change from an item-driven to 
a construct-driven practice and pay more attention to disciplinary scientific 
reasoning. It investigates assessment scales developed from a novel theoretical 
rationale, describing scientific reasoning as three fundamental practices 
(hypothesising, experimenting and evidence evaluation) and building on three 
types of knowledge (science content knowledge, procedural knowledge and 
epistemic knowledge). The scale development follows a construct-driven 
approach by, first, detailing the knowledge involved and explaining progression; 
and second, operationalising the theoretical construct into items and score 
criteria. The scales are trialled in a small-scale study. The outcome is a coherent 
and supportive ‘validity argument’ for three sub-scales, but with a suggestion 
that merging these into one scale has higher validity. The main implication is 
rewriting rationales for many science assessments, including TIMSS, which 
emphasises domain-general reasoning, and NAEP and PISA, which pay attention 
to domain-specific reasoning but are unclear about the knowledge involved.  
 
Key words: Assessment, Scientific reasoning, Scientific Argumentation, Science 
Inquiry. 
 
Introduction 
This paper presents a study into assessment of scientific reasoning 
motivated by two major challenges. These are first, the ‘positivist’ view of science 
dominating classroom practices, placing emphasis on factual recall and 
confirmatory experiments (Driver, Newton, & Osborne, 2000; Layton, 1973; 
Weiss, Pasely, Sean Smith, Banilower, & Heck, 2003) and second, the tendency in 
science assessment to use items making lower level cognitive demands of recall 
and comprehension as opposed to the higher level demands of synthesis and 
evaluation (J. Osborne & Ratcliff, 2002; Pellegrino, Chudowsky, & Glaser, 2001; 
Shavelson & Ruiz-Primo, 1999; Mark Wilson & Bertenhal, 2005). According to 
Au’s (2007) meta-analysis these two challenges are related, because teachers 
match expectations of student performance to those of the test. Improving 
assessment of scientific reasoning is, therefore, an important step towards 
changing classroom practices.  
The main argument of the paper is that improving assessment of scientific 
reasoning should start with, and work from, an improved construct definition. 
This is, in part, based on Wiliam’s (2010) claim that assessors tend to mix up the 
two uses of the term construct identified by Wiley (2001, p. 212). These are, first, 
“to name the psychological characteristics actually estimated by an existing test 
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score or other measurement” and, second, “to name the psychological 
characteristics that a test score or other measurement is intended (‘designed’) to 
measure”. By allowing the actual test score to define the construct, Wiliam 
claims, assessment becomes ‘item-driven’ rather than ‘construct-driven’. The 
suggested solution is to lay out a formal construct definition that clarifies what 
should be included and excluded from an assessment, independently of the test, 
and then argue systematically how the construct can be operationalised into a 
measure. Wiliam’s argument summarises a key development in assessment 
theory over the last decades, as can be observed in the ‘validity chapters’ written 
by Messick (1989) and Kane (2006). Kane, who introduced the phrase ‘validity 
as argument’, explains that the relationship between the intended and 
operationalised constructs cannot be absolutely determined and therefore 
requires informal reasoning as described by Toulmin (1958). Mislevy, Wilson, 
Erickan & Chudowsky (2003) demonstrate in more concrete terms how 
construct-driven assessment can be put into practice. They suggest constructing 
a student model, identifying and explaining the configuration of skills and 
knowledge students are intended to learn; a task model, describing and 
explaining the situations in which students should be able to act; a scoring model, 
explaining how students’ performance to items can be graded; and a 
measurement model, explaining how student’s performance can be transformed 
to a measure. Other examples working to implement similar perspectives are 
Wilson (2005), Rupp, Templin and Henson (2010) and Leighton, Gierl and Hunka 
(2004). All these use ‘modern test theory’ (Crocker & Algina, 1986), based on 
Item Response Theory (IRT) and Rasch models to support the construct-driven 
and evidence-centred assessment approach. They also include what Wilson 
(2005) terms a ‘developmental perspective’, namely that assessment models 
should be aligned with progression in teaching and students’ learning.  
Another reason for focusing on construct definition to improve 
assessment and classroom practices is the state of scientific reasoning research. 
Rather than being dominated by one rationale, scientific reasoning is 
characterised by a multitude of meanings, some conflicting. In particular, the 
influence of cognitive psychology gives impetus to the ‘nothing special view’ 
(Simon, 1966) – that general reasoning abilities account for the main 
characteristics of scientific reasoning. This contrasts with disciplinary 
perspectives, such as that of Ford (2008), in which scientific reasoning is seen as 
a domain-specific practice. A related issue is the knowledge-dependency of 
reasoning (Koslowski, 1996; Passmore & Stewart, 2002), including debate about 
what type of knowledge is involved (Li & Shavelson, 2001). Discrepancy also 
exists between psychologists’ and philosophers’ perspectives on reasoning. 
Psychologists commonly take a descriptive perspective, focusing on cognitive 
processes and abilities, while philosophers take a normative perspective, 
focusing on epistemological principles and values intrinsic to reasoning. Bailin 
and Siegel (2002) explain that the former group is concerned mainly with how 
someone reasons, while the latter seeks to understand why students reason as 
they do. In science education, these perspectives merge, since students learn to 
reason scientifically and understand how science works, however, with science 
educators often subscribing to rationales for scientific reasoning from either 
psychology or philosophy. An outcome is to persist with naïve perspectives 
about the other field. An example, discussed later in the paper, is ‘process 
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science’ in the 1970s and 80s, which found support in contemporary psychology 
but continued logical-empiricist views of science that philosophers had rejected. 
Hence, assessment needs better guidance about what scientific reasoning means, 
and also evidence to illustrate how it occurs in students’ learning. 
The current paper unites the two challenges above, that is, establishing 
construct-driven assessment with an improved rationale for scientific reasoning, 
because these are mutually dependent. Previously, the author and colleagues 
(paper in review) suggested a disciplinary reasoning rationale, aiming for 
consensus and improved teaching practice by synthesising perspectives in 
philosophy and psychology. The rationale has already demonstrated relevance 
through influencing the new K-12 Science Framework in the US (National 
Research Council, 2012), but has yet to be applied for scale development. The 
purpose here is, therefore, to establish assessment scales that operationalise the 
new rationale by following construct-driven ideals. The aimed-for outcome is a 
validity argument, as suggested by Kane (2006), and based on Mislevy et al.’s 
(2002) four models (student model, item model, scoring model and 
measurement model) to explain how scientific reasoning can be implemented in 
assessment. The aim is also to support this argument with empirical evidence 
from trialling. The research is significant in two respects:  first, it contributes 
towards understanding implications of construct-driven assessment in science 
education. Few examples exist, so more research is needed to investigate how 
construct-driven ideals can be put into practice. Second, the research contributes 
towards understanding how scientific reasoning may be implemented into 
assessment to support teaching and learning directly. The research also 
promotes better understanding of scientific reasoning, by prompting ‘dialog’ 
between assessments and educational theory (Bond, 2003). 
The paper begins by explaining the rationale for scientific reasoning and 
arguments behind its development, followed by a section defining scales. The 
empirical trialling of scales is introduced, and the validity argument is outlined – 
that is, how the intended construct is operationalised into item-, scoring- and 
measurement models. The discussion reflects on what has been learned from the 
trials for construct-driven assessment and development of reasoning scales. 
 
Scientific reasoning  
Definitions for scientific reasoning have been proposed, relying on 
differing understandings of science and reasoning, thereby drawing on 
developments in science studies and learning sciences.  Prominent in 1960s-
1980s science education was the process approach, which defined science 
inquiry as a list of processes and related reasoning to a matching list of cognitive 
skills. Gagne (1965), then prominent in the US, described his list of science 
processes as ‘behaviours of scientists that could be learned by students’. His 
accompanying curriculum project, the ‘Science – A Process Approach’ (American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, 1965), became influential, 
demonstrating how processes could be taught in science classrooms. Piaget’s 
(1954) ‘stage theory’ of cognitive development provided a second contribution 
to the process rationale, identifying reasoning strategies that children could or 
could not undertake at different stages. The outcome, a list of general, non-
science specific ‘cognitive operations’, has similarities to Gagne’s science 
processes: one common denominator is the claim that processes and operations 
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are knowledge-independent and therefore generalisable across content domains. 
Science educators linked these, arguing that learning scientific method 
developed science reasoning processes, thus improving general cognition and 
improving students’ learning of science knowledge  (Lawson, Karplus, & Adi, 
1978; Shayer & Adey, 1981). 
 Dramatic changes in the conception of science method occurred in the 
1960s -1980s due to critique of logical empiricism and positivism in science 
philosophy. This critique became general knowledge among science educators in 
this period, forming the basis for criticism of the process approach. For example, 
Finley (1983) attacked Gagne for inadequate understanding of scientific method, 
on the grounds that he failed to acknowledge Hempel (1966), Quine (1969) and 
Hanson (1958). These philosophers argue that scientific observations occur only 
in the context of a conceptual scheme, meaning that all observations are theory-
laden, and suggest no algorithm makes it possible to generalize observations into 
scientific theories. Their arguments shaped a new science philosophy, in which 
scientific reasoning is content- rather than process-led.  Finley concluded that “if 
science educators are to understand better the nature of science processes, the 
relationships between content and process must be understood” (p. 53). Similar 
critique of Piaget’s psychology pointed out that students’ abilities to use 
cognitive operations was strongly dependent on their understanding of content 
and contexts (Brown & Desforges, 1977; Donaldson, 1984). Millar and Driver 
(1987) summarised these philosophical and psychological critiques, showing 
that science education needed a better rationale for scientific reasoning to guide 
research and teaching practices. 
Answering this critique became a central focus, resulting in three 
research strands. First, research focusing on science misconceptions and 
conceptual change (Driver & Easley, 1978; Hewson, 1981; R. J. Osborne, 1982) 
turned attention away from scientific reasoning and claimed, like Ausubel 
(Ausubel, 1968), that ‘what students know’ is more important than ‘how they 
reason’.  This strand evolved to claim that  students’ conceptual changes in 
science learning are similar to scientists’ reasoning used to develop new ideas 
and theories (R.J. Osborne & Wittrock, 1985). Kelly’s (1955) metaphor of man-
the-scientist was an influential analogy, paralleling the way individuals construct 
personal representations of the world with scientists’ construction of theories. 
Personal representations, Kelly argued, are subject to change over time from 
constant testing and modification permitting better predictions of real world 
behaviour. Constant questioning, exploring, revising and replacing in the light of 
predictive failure is symptomatic of scientific theorising, and is precisely how a 
person learns to anticipate life events. Many, including McCloskey, (1983) and 
Pope & Keen (1981) acknowledged the limitations of this analogy,  but still 
supported the notion that students’ reasoning when learning science content 
knowledge is a form of scientific reasoning.  
Second, research on reasoning in scientific inquiry tried more directly to 
improve Gagne’s process skills rationale. An important response was presented 
by Gott and Mashiter (1991) who suggested procedural knowledge was a 
“missing element” (p. 58) in the process approach. Based on Gott and Murphy 
(1987), they argued that students who failed to solve inquiry tasks often lacked 
understanding of experimental procedures and concepts. This procedural 
knowledge, together with science conceptual knowledge, they claimed, could 
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explain Gagne’s process skills. Research proposed a framework, or ‘taxonomy’, 
for procedural knowledge, describing experimental concepts and ideas for the 
science curriculum (Duggan & Gott, 1995; Gott & Duggan, 1995, 1996). Millar, 
Lubben, Gott and Duggan (1994) also provided evidence that procedural 
understanding, when tested by questionnaire, accounted for 50% or more of the 
variance observed in students’ performance on practical investigative tasks. 
These authors found that students hold misconceptions about scientific method 
that negatively influence practical task performance. Thus, this response also 
defines scientific reasoning as knowledge-based, but focuses on experimentation 
rather than theorisation, and explaining this as reasoning based on a 
combination of procedural and conceptual knowledge. 
A third, more recent strand presents scientific argumentation (Driver et 
al., 2000) as the answer to the critic of the process approach. A rationale for 
science pedagogy “that is coherent and based on current scholarship and 
research in the field of science studies and the philosophy of science” (p. 290) 
should be the new focus for scientific reasoning activity. This meant accepting 
science knowledge as socially constructed, rather than relying on observations 
and experiments as the ‘bedrock’ of science. As replacements, scientific 
reasoning should rely on evidence evaluation and coordination, with epistemic 
knowledge as a pre-requisite knowledge-base (Duschl & Osborne, 2002; G. J. 
Kelly & Duschl, 2002). Attention, as in the assessment area mentioned earlier, 
has been drawn towards Toulmin’s (1958) model for informal reasoning.  
Together, these three strands focus on key scientific practices with which 
scientists handle different problems.  First, they develop scientific theories; next, 
they gather empirical data used to test the theories; and third, they coordinate 
and evaluate evidence critically. These practices may occur in different orders 
but are complementary, as the outcome of one acts as the starting point for the 
next. An argument raised by this paper is, therefore, that the research strands 
collectively set a rationale for scientific reasoning by identifying three practices, 
each belonging to a different stage of the inquiry process.  
This rationale is elaborated by a psychological and a philosophical model. 
From a psychological perspective, the individual enters a particular mode of 
thinking in each stage due to the problem they have to solve. This is described by 
Klahr and Dunbar’s (1988) Scientific Discovery as Dual Search (SDDS) model, 
derived from results of psychological experiments (Klahr, 2000) in which 
candidates (university students and school children) solved simulated scientific 
inquiry tasks. The model describes the two first phases, hypothesis generation 
and experimenting, as ‘problem spaces’ and the third, evidence evaluation, as a 
coordination of outcomes from these. A problem space comprises states, 
operators, goals, and constraints, suggesting, in a similar way to Johnson-Laird’s 
(1983) model-based reasoning, that an individual reasons with the help of 
personal conceptualisation of the problem to be solved. Klahr and Dunbar take a 
domain-general view,  paying most attention to problem solving strategies 
(called  weak methods) that apply across the three spaces, but admit that 
domain-specific knowledge of science phenomena and research techniques give 
rise to ‘strong methods’. In hypothesis generation, for example, the individual 
uses personal models of the physical phenomenon involved (Gentner & Stevens, 
1983; Harrison & Treagust, 2000), and evaluate these using scientific epistemic 
criteria (Pluta, Chinn, & Duncan, 2011). The point to be made is that all three 
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types of knowledge identified earlier, i.e. conceptual-, procedural- and epistemic 
knowledge, play important roles in shaping the personal conceptualisations in 
students’ scientific reasoning. 
Gière, Bickle and Mauldin (2006) explain the three reasoning practices 
from a normative, philosophical perspective. This states that scientific reasoning 
is, fundamentally, critical reasoning, and that all three practices outlined above 
are linked to criteria explaining how problems should be solved. In other words, 
when scientists, or students, solve problems in each phase of scientific inquiry, 
adaptation to certain standards set by the science community is required. These 
standards are embedded in content, procedural and epistemic knowledge. When 
reasoning scientifically, an individual should use established science content 
knowledge, follow recognised experimental procedure(s) and adapt to certain 
epistemic criteria. Combining Gière et al.’s work with the SDDS model suggests 
that expert scientists are better at scientific reasoning because they have 
superior understanding of these three knowledge types.  Novices may improve 
their reasoning ability by developing understanding of the same knowledge. 
These perspectives provide the foundation for the assessment scales developed 
in the current study. 
Noticeably, the rationale takes a different knowledge-oriented 
perspective on scientific reasoning compared to psychologists such as Koslowski 
(1996), Klaczynski (2000), and Hogan and Maglienti (2001) and science 
educators such as Zeineddin and Abd-El-Khalick (2010), who also challenge the 
domain-general view. These authors focus on the role of knowledge in scientific 
reasoning, but focus mainly on science conceptual knowledge and take this to 
influence scientific reasoning. In the current rationale, knowledge is part of the 
definition. Hence, scientific reasoning is defined as reasoning with three types of 
knowledge. Examples elaborating this difference and the knowledge involved 
follow. 
 
Assessment scales for scientific reasoning  
Generally, assessment scales for scientific reasoning in extant literature 
reflect the trend Zimmerman (2000; 2007) observed - that researchers admit 
reasoning is knowledge-dependent, but has domain-general strategies as foci. In 
this perspective, content knowledge is a problem, solved by reduction or 
‘control’. In the UK, the Assessment of Performance Unit (APU) survey (Johnson, 
1987), for example, “produc[ed] process questions with minimum content 
dependence” (p. 100) to overcome this problem; that is, ‘knowledge-lean’ items 
were used. The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
Achievement (IEA) adopted a different strategy for the Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), utilising ‘averaging’ reasoning 
processes across items with different contents (Martin, Mullis, & Foy, 2008). 
Figure 1 shows how a content scale is made by adding up physics items across all 
‘behaviour domains’ and a reasoning scale is made by adding up items with the 
same ‘behaviour’ across all content domains. The same is done in all four rows 
and three columns. 
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The scientific reasoning rationale applied here differs from earlier work 
in two ways. Firstly, reasoning and knowledge are not separated but instead 
treated as two integrated parts of scientific reasoning. The assessment regimes 
discussed above express concern about reasoning being knowledge-dependent 
but accept knowledge being reasoning-dependent: while trying to avoid 
knowledge in reasoning tasks it intentionally aims to include different types and 
levels of reasoning in knowledge tasks. Understanding means being able to 
reason with the knowledge. A determining point, however, is that no item can be 
placed in the grid in Figure 1 and classified along one axis only. Any item, 
whether in a content scale or a reasoning scale, tests a combination of ‘behaviour’ 
and ‘content’. Thus, Figure 1 shows primarily that behaviour and content (i.e. 
reasoning and knowledge) have limited value on their own for constructing 
assessment scales. They must be seen together.  
Secondly, the rationale for this study defines procedural and epistemic 
knowledge as well as science content knowledge. So far, this has been argued 
from a science education perspective, but has a wider meaning. Krathwohl 
(2002) describes how Anderson et al.’s (2001) revision of Bloom’s taxonomy of 
the cognitive domain is based on an extended conceptualisation of knowledge. 
The new framework uses four categories to describe the knowledge dimension: 
factual knowledge, conceptual knowledge, procedural knowledge and 
metacognitive knowledge. Likewise, Li and Shavelson (2001) produce a similar 
framework splitting knowledge into declarative knowledge (knowing what), 
procedural knowledge (knowing how), schematic knowledge (knowing why), 
and strategic knowledge  (knowing when, where, how knowledge applies). The 
common point in these, and other examples, is that they alter the relationship 
between knowledge and reasoning. What used to be explained as a reasoning 
‘skill’ is now seen as application of a body of knowledge of ‘what we know’, ‘how 
we know’ and ‘why it happens’. For example, the much investigated ‘skill’ of 
controlling variables (CoV) can be explained as applying epistemic knowledge 
about dependent, independent and control variables and criteria for defining 
their cause-effect relationships. It also involves understanding procedural 
knowledge about how to do ‘fair testing’ – that is, having a strategy for testing 
only one variable at the time and holding other variables the same.   
On this basis, the format shown in Figure 2, which summarises the 
reasoning rationale from the previous section, has been used to specify 
assessment scales. It differs from Figure 1 by identifying three science practices 
rather than general cognitive levels. It also takes into consideration all three 
knowledge types. Together this creates various options for scale definition. Thus, 
scales may be ‘narrow’, measuring one or a few sub-constructs of scientific 
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reasoning, or ‘wide’, measuring all aspects involved (Andrich, 2007). The 
narrowest scale focuses on one type of knowledge used within one practice, for 
example, using procedural knowledge in experimenting. Most problems, 
however, will include a combination of knowledge types, for example, gathering 
data also means using conceptual knowledge to interpret the data and epistemic 
knowledge to evaluate the data.  Hypothesising, experimenting and evidence 
evaluation, therefore, are three scales that are more meaningful: using all three 
types of knowledge to solve the problems of explaining a science phenomenon, of 
obtaining data to test explanations, and of coordinating explanations and 
evidence. The study will look at these scales separately, but also merge them into 
one combined reasoning scale. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 does not account for progression in the scales. Figure 1 accounts 
for this partly by a hierarchical relationship between the three behaviour 
domains, which TIMSS (Martin et al., 2008) refers to as ‘cognitive demand’. The 
horizontal ‘knowledge scales’, therefore, involves answering questions at three 
cognitive levels (knowing, application and higher order reasoning). In Figure 2, 
the same would mean answering questions in three different practices 
(explaining phenomena, doing experiments and evaluating claims), which are 
not hierarchical. Comparing the two figures, however, suggests that cognitive 
level can be added to Figure 2 as a ‘third dimension’. The authors of the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) science framework (National 
Assessment Governing Board, 2008) reached the same conclusion, naming the 
dimension ‘performance expectation’ and using three different levels ‘basic’, 
‘proficient’ and ‘advanced’. This progression dimension, however, also takes into 
consideration that knowledge can be hierarchically difficult, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. Item 1 assesses ‘basic’ performance, by including simple knowledge 
and low level general cognition, while Item 2 assesses ‘advanced’ performance, 
involving advanced ideas and high level general cognition. Any combination, of 
course, is possible, creating items between the two extremes. Using three levels 
is relevant only as a guideline.  
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The line of argument above leaves three scales, hypothesising, 
experimenting and evidence evaluation, based on understanding conceptual, 
procedural and epistemic knowledge and using cognitive demand together with 
complexity of the knowledge to set progression levels. This rationale differs 
theoretically but shares a common interest with NAEP and TIMSS in trying to 
integrate scientific reasoning into the science curriculum. It differs, however, 
substantially from Lawson’s (1978; 2004) Classroom Test of Scientific Reasoning 
(LCTSR), which is one of the most commonly used test in scientific reasoning 
research (Bao et al., 2009) and based on Piaget’s (1954) ‘formal operational 
schemata’. The remainder of the paper develops the validity argument for the 
current rationale by operationalising the suggested scales and providing trial 
data. To help explore the knowledge dimensions, the scale development places 
increased focus on conceptual knowledge in hypothesising, procedural 
knowledge in experimenting and epistemic knowledge in evidence evaluation (as 
highlighted in Figure 2), although all three types of knowledge are involved in all 
three scales.  
 
 
 
Methodology for scale development and trials 
The study aimed to operationalise scales for hypothesising, experimenting 
and evidence evaluation, and to provide empirical evidence supporting the 
validity argument. For practical reasons, however, this full process was 
conducted for the two last scales only. Schools involved in trialling (see below) 
used teacher-designed tests for conceptual areas as a substitute for 
hypothesising, focused on explaining science phenomena. Although not ideal, this 
had the advantage that many content areas could be included and a series of 
subtests generated to produce the final scale. The scale was made with data from 
six content-led science tests: Human Biology, Evolution Theory, Geoscience 
(Rocks), Chemistry (Oil), Physics (Energy and Radiation). Each test was held 
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shortly after teaching and included items on a range of cognitive demands and 
conceptual difficulty. The two remaining scales were regarded as most 
interesting and challenging for the study. For these scales, the development 
process started with establishing Mislevy et al.’s (2002) ‘student model’ from 
research literature. Literature was used in identifying the procedural knowledge 
students use in experimentation and the epistemic knowledge used in evidence 
evaluation, and also, to establish the learning progression occuring in these. Next, 
items were selected from the same literature or developed to match identified 
knowledge and suggested progression. Third, scoring criteria were established 
for each item using the predicted progression in the student model. The study 
used a combination of ordered multiple choice items (OMC), as suggested by 
Briggs, Alonzo, Schwab, and Wilson (2006), ordinary MC items and open-ended 
(OE) items. This meant progression in a student’s ability was reflected in the 
scale by overall difficulty of the item and difficulty of each response 
alternative/score category. Trialling was the last step in the development 
procedure. Items for both scales were placed in random order in a pencil-and-
paper test for completion by students. Steps three and four, however, were 
repeated in four iterations to improve the face validity of the items and 
alignment with the student model. For example, some items were trialled in 
different formats (OE and MC) and MC items were adjusted to create better 
separation between response alternatives. These changes were based on 
statistical information from Rasch analysis (see below), but also ‘expert 
comments’ from teachers and fellow researchers. 
The population in mind for the assessment is lower secondary education, 
which in the UK includes 12 to 16 year old students. The sample comprised 
mixed ability 14-15 year old students from six state-funded secondary schools in 
northern England, as shown in Table 1. The sample was not randomly selected, 
but from schools collaborating with the University. A random sample, however, 
was not regarded as a crucial since focus was on scale development. The main 
criteria were that students were drawn from a broad ability range and there was 
an  ‘opportunity to learn’, that is, a match between taught curricula and test 
topic. The national science curriculum (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 
2007) in England places much emphasis on experimenting and evidence 
evaluation in both laboratory and socio-scientific settings. Research studies 
(Abrahams & Millar, 2008) point out that laboratory experiments and teaching 
about science do not always match the ideals of the intended curriculum, yet 
items in the test were regarded as familiar problems to the students. The 
experiment and evidence evaluation test was presented as a test of ‘How science 
works’, a topic familiar to students.  
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Table 1 
Reliability values (Cronbach’s Alpha), number of items and sample sizes during four 
different iterations of test development. N is number of item in each scale.  
 Test 1  
28 students 
Test 2  
38 students 
Test 3  
133 
students 
Test 4  
139 
students 
 N α N α N α N α 
Evidence evaluation 
      Item-level 
      Testlet-level 
 
26 
5 
 
0.14 
0.07 
 
23 
5 
 
0.85 
0.73 
 
20 
4 
 
0.80 
0.72 
 
19 
4 
 
0.83 
0.70 
Experimenting 
      Item-level 
      Testlet-level 
 
26 
5 
 
0.74 
0.58 
 
22 
4 
 
0.87 
0.59 
 
9 
2 
 
0.67 
0.62 
 
13 
3 
 
0.78 
0.61 
.   
 
Table 1 documents the iterations. The first two iterations tested items and 
scales crudely by groups of about thirty students in pencil-and-paper tests 
lasting about an hour each. Major changes were made between these iterations 
by using different item formats and improving response alternatives. Many 
multiple choice items in the first iteration were replaced with more open-ended 
items. Smaller changes, such as improving the text in line with comments from 
subject experts, were made between the third and fourth iterations Larger 
numbers of students took the third and fourth iteration tests. The number of 
items was reduced to reduce the time required to complete the test. Table 1 
shows how these issues affected reliability. For example, although the 
experimenting scale showed good consistency in the first iteration, the scale 
comprised more than twenty questions in four items, requiring a long time to 
complete. By the third iteration, the scale was reduced to two items spread over 
nine individually scored questions. This resulted in a drop in Cronbach’s alpha 
from 0.87 to 0.67.  One previously deleted item was reinstated for the final 
iteration, making a scale with thirteen individually scored items, increasing alpha 
to 0.78. Reliability for evidence evaluation was very low in the first iteration, 
using multiple choice items, but improved when these were replaced by open-
ended items. 
Students’ responses were coded and analysed quantitatively in two ways. 
Firstly, information about individual items from raw scores and item statistics, 
including distractor choice in MC items and response patterns in OMC/OE items, 
were examined.  Secondly, scales were produced and examined using Rasch 
(1960) analysis in Winsteps (Linacre & Wright, 2001). The reason for using 
Rasch analysis is that it establishes a measurement model supporting construct-
driven assessment and draws attention towards progression (Wilson, 2005).  
The Rasch model produces measures, or estimated score values, from raw data. 
Different Rasch models are used for dichotomous-, Likert- and rating-scored 
items, but all models estimate the probability of a student with a certain ability 
to get an item of a certain difficulty level correct. Here, analysis used the partial-
credit model (Masters, 1982) with uni-dimensional analysis. The analysis 
produces separate measures for item difficulty and student’s ability, presented in 
an item-person map (example shown in Figure 4). Where a student and an item 
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have the same value (aligned positions of the scale), the Rasch model estimates a 
50% chance that the student will get that item correct. The student is less likely 
to get more difficult items correct and more likely to get easier items correct, a 
feature that can be read directly from the map placements. Comparing students’ 
and items’ measures thus permit some understanding of the level of 
performance associated with a specific ability level, thereby helping construct 
understanding. The item-person map can also analyse if progression aligns with 
theoretical expectations; in other words, if data confirm the predicted pattern of 
difficulty set out in the student model. This is important evidence for scale 
validity (J. Smith, E.V., 2004). Rasch analysis produces indicators of statistical 
quality (consistency) of the scale, including an indicator of ‘fit’ between raw data 
and estimated measures; analysis of the differentiated item functioning (DIF); 
category statistics; and measures of discrimination, separation and reliability. 
Detailed information about these can be obtained from Bond & Fox (2001). 
A final step in the analysis examined ‘dimensionality’ of the scales using 
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) in Winsteps (Linacre & Wright, 2001). PCA 
‘tests’ the Rasch model uni-dimensionality assumption by examining factors in 
the residual between the measures and the observed data. In the case of uni-
dimensionality, no other significant factors should be found. The analysis looked 
separately at hypothesising, experimenting and evidence evaluation, but also at a 
total scale including all three subscales. Correlation values between the scales 
were also examined. 
 
Outcomes from scale development and trialling 
Separate outcomes and findings are presented for the experimenting and 
evidence evaluation scales. The ‘student model’ is explained for each scale with 
comments about the knowledge involved and progression. Examples follow 
showing how these student models were operationalised into items and scoring 
models, then empirical results emerging from the trials. After presenting the two 
scales, results from dimensionality analysis are presented. Unless mentioned 
otherwise, all data were obtained from the last iteration shown in Table 1.  
 
Experimenting 
Gott and Murphy’s (1987) research on procedural knowledge was used as 
the basis for defining the scale on reasoning as experimenting. They pioneered 
work attributing students’ failure or success in laboratory tasks to 
understanding ‘strategies of scientific enquiry’ (p13). Subsequently, Duggan and 
Gott (1995) established a procedural knowledge ‘taxonomy’, suggesting 
knowledge students should understand at various phases of a scientific 
investigation. These ideas were selected for our scale: 
 
Knowledge about variables and their cause-effect relationships, e.g.  
- identifying and explaining dependent and independent variables; 
and 
- understanding the role of a confounding variable. 
Knowledge about measurement of a single variable, e.g. 
- understanding that a single measurement has uncertainty and that 
repeated measurements therefore are likely to vary;  
- understanding strategies for making an accurate measurement, 
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such as doing repeated measurements and finding the mean; and 
- knowing about anomalous data and having a strategy for handling 
these. 
Understanding and using strategies for ‘fair testing’ of cause and effect among 
a set of variables 
 
Lubben and Millar (1996) identified eight progression levels in students’ 
understanding of procedural knowledge. Simplifying these into three 
fundamental levels suggests, at the lowest level, students may understand 
measurements as direct observations of ‘true’ values. This excludes uncertainty, 
making repeated measurements unnecessary. When two measurements of the 
same variable give different values, one must be wrong. Students, however, still 
understand the cause-effect relationship between variables and may be able to 
carry out ‘fair testing’ strategies. At the next level, students show more 
awareness of uncertainty and the importance of making several measurements, 
but may believe a true value is attainable. Commonly, for example, students will 
make measurements until two identical values are achieved, or claim more than 
one measurement is needed. At the most advanced level, students understand a 
true value is unattainable, and the best result is averaging several measurements. 
Students have strategies for handling this and evaluating a series of 
measurements, such as looking for anomalous data and evaluating variation in 
repeated measurements.  
Research on ‘control of variable’ strategies (Kuhn, 2002; Zimmerman, 
2007) gives more information about progression of the student model. As 
suggested, students at any level may understand cause and effect between 
variables and ‘fair testing’ strategies. The difficulty level, however, increases as 
more variables are included and when negative co-variation is involved. Control 
of variables is also more demanding if non-co-variation, that is, a dependent 
variable not influenced by an independent variable is included, rather than just 
co-variation (Kanari & Millar, 2004). 
Procedural knowledge interacts with epistemic knowledge, firstly, 
because students need to understand the purpose of experimenting (Driver, 
Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996), and secondly, because epistemological 
understanding of a measurement influences the strategies necessary for making 
accurate measurements. As shown later, the three levels of understanding 
measurements match levels of students’ personal epistemology (Perry, 1970) 
from ‘naïve positivism’ towards ‘informed relativism’.  Procedural knowledge 
interacts also with science conceptual knowledge, because any measurement is 
of a science phenomenon, influencing both what measurement to make and what 
strategy to choose. Interactions cannot be avoided, but can be adapted to the 
purpose of the scale. For example, items may ask questions about the 
measurements and not explaining the phenomena, and include phenomena 
students are supposed to understand empirically. Students, for example, are 
supposed to learn to measure temperature and time. Importantly, however, the 
procedural knowledge listed above applies across phenomena and is not unique 
to any specific measurement. 
Items were selected and adapted to fit the procedural knowledge and 
levels of reasoning described above. Examples of assessment items exist in 
Lubben and Millar (1996), J. Osborne and Ratcliffe  (2002) and Roberts and Gott 
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(2006), and Goldsworthy, Watson and Wood-Robinson (2000) and Gott and 
Duggan (2003). Next, a scoring model was established for each item adapting the 
same rationale. Examples are shown below. 
First, Table 2 illustrates a less successful OMC item from the first 
iteration, asking students to estimate the number of measurements needed in an 
experiment testing the time required to dissolve sugar in water. Response 
alternatives were provided with three levels of understanding measurements 
described above. At the lowest level (0 points) a response suggests one 
measurement is enough; at medium level (1 point) a response suggests more 
than one measurement (either a set number of measurements or until two the 
same are obtained); and at the highest level (2 points) a response takes into 
consideration the level of variation. The table presents the number of students 
(and percentages) giving each response with their average total score on the 
scale. The 11 students selecting alternative d, the highest scoring answer, had the 
lowest total score whereas the highest scoring students selected alternatives b 
and e. This response pattern caused negative discrimination, so despite being 
well aligned with the student model, the item is unsuitable for a scale. A likely 
reason the item failed is that high ability students learn measurement strategies 
(such as “always make a set number of measurements”) without learning the 
epistemic knowledge; that is, they learn the strategy but not why its use is 
appropriate (Lubben and Millar, 1996). The problem, however, seemed to be 
brought out more severely because few students understand the importance of 
level of variation between measurements. Revising the item was considered, but 
with a conclusion that two items are needed to test the intended outcome: one 
testing ‘the need for repeated measurements’ and the other testing ‘variation in 
measurements’. How ‘variation’ influences ‘number of measurements’ seems to 
be high level understanding beyond what the involved student group 
understands.  
 
Table 2 
Item in experimenting scale 
Jasmine was asked to do an experiment to find how long it takes some sugar to dissolve in 
water. What advice should you give Jasmine to tell her how many repeated measurements 
she should make?  (Choose one) 
    
 N Percent Ability 
measure 
a) Two or three measurements are always enough  (1pt) 35 31.0 55.2 
b) She should always make 5 measurements (1pt) 37 32.7 60.5 
c) If she is accurate she only needs to measure once (0pt) 2 1.8 57.1 
d) She should go on taking measurements until she knows how 
much they vary (2 pts) 
11 9.7 54.7 
e) She should go on making measurements until she gets two or 
more the same (1pt) 
28 24.8 61.3 
Total 113 100  
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 In contrast, Table 3 shows a successful item called ‘EXP4’. This assessed 
students’ reasoning using knowledge about uncertainty in measurement. A 
school experiment, with data, was presented as a stem, followed by three 
questions. Question A asked why measurements are not the same over four 
repetitions, offering four possible responses. Responses were designed to reflect 
the student model, with the correct alternative, b, placed at the second level of 
understanding (that measurements may have uncertainty). Table 3 (Question A) 
shows 56% of respondents got the item right, and that discrimination worked 
well. Question B asked for a strategy to handle uncertainty in measurements. 
Here, two response alternatives gave  credit: students scored 2 points for 
alternative b, which suggested removing the irregular measurement before 
averaging the other measurements, and 1 point for alternative a, to average the 
measurements. These alternatives reflect different levels in progression of 
procedural understanding. Distractor d was not selected, but the overall 
discrimination pattern confirms good progression within the remaining 
responses.  
Students omitting the item had the lowest total scores.  Question C asked 
students to select the conclusion they most agreed with. This anticipated higher 
cognitive demand, as using a strategy relating tabulated data and comparing 
results between fictitious students was expected. Responses scored 1 point for 
selecting a conclusion that matched the strategy suggested in question B, and 2 
points for adding an appropriate reason. Results show good discrimination and 
indicate that the theoretical prediction of progression correlates well with 
student data. 
Figure 4 presents the outcomes of applying the Rasch model and placing 
the item in Table 3 together with other items measuring experimentation into an 
item-person map. The scale is the vertical dotted line. Values at 10 point intervals 
are far left.  Items, with each question marked separately are to the right of the 
line. Each is labelled ‘EXP’ for experimenting with the last letter indicating the 
question in each item (e.g. EXP5D is question D in item 5). The ‘callouts’ give the 
question topics. Each X to the left of the line represents a student. Mean values 
for item difficulty and students’ abilities are marked with ‘M’ and one and two 
standard deviations with ‘S’ and ‘T’.  
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Table 3 
Item (EXP4) in experimenting scale. Stem above tables. Last column in tables show 
total score on the scale. 
Daniel, Philip and Tom investigated how a trainer slips on different surfaces. They put a mass in the 
trainer and measured the pull (with a Newton-meter) needed to drag the trainer along.  They tested 
each surface four times.   
 
 
Pull 
 
Here are their results: 
 Pull/force (Newtons) 
Type of surface First time Second time Third time Fourth time 
Playground 11 12 13 21 
Grass 14 13 13 14 
Classroom carpet 8 9 8 9 
Polished floor 8 7 7 8 
A. They thought they had done everything the same. What is the most likely reason they didn’t 
get the same measurement each time on the same surface?  (Tick one box) 
  Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Ability 
measure 
a. They were not as accurate as they thought. Being more 
accurate they would have got it right 
23 20.9 57.0 
b. Measurements never are exactly the same, however hard you 
try get it accurate (1 pt) 
62 56.4 62.9 
c. The surfaces must have got slippier each time they did their 
test 
13 11.8 49.2 
d. There must have been something wrong with the Newton- 
meter as they repeated the measurement 
12 10.9 55.8 
Non-response 5 4.3 33.3 
Total 115 100.0  
B. How should they decide which results they should use? (Choose one) 
  Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Ability 
measure 
a. Add up measurements from all trials and divide by 4 to get 
the average (1 pt) 
58 50.4 56.1 
b. Take away irregular (odd) measurements, then get average 
among the rest  (2pt) 
40 34.8 69.3 
c. Choose measurements that are the same (occur several 
times)  
9 7.8 47.2 
d. Choose the lowest value, because this is the least force that 
was needed 
0 0  
Non-response 8 7.0 29.2 
Total 115 100.0  
C. The boys disagreed about the conclusion on which surface needed most force. Who do you 
agree with? Choose one and explain why. 
 Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Ability 
measure 
Select right person and give relevant reason (2 pt) 37 32.2 73.1 
Select right person (1 pt) 47 40.9 55.6 
Select wrong person (0 pt) 31 27.0 44.1 
Total 115 100.0  
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Questions A to E in Item EXP1 are lowest in the scale and the easiest 
questions. These asked students to identify variables. Item 1 is classified as ‘low 
level’ reasoning requiring simple use of the terms dependent, independent and 
control variables. Item EXP4 (see Table 3), is mid-scale. As this item required 
students to demonstrate understanding of strategies to handle uncertainty in 
data, it was classified as involving more complex knowledge and demanding 
higher level thinking than EXP 1. Questions A to D in EXP5 asked students to test 
hypotheses, use control of variable strategies, and reach the correct conclusion. 
Figure 4 shows EXP5 A and C were ‘easier’ than Band D, which were the two 
most difficult of all, as these appear towards the top of the scale. These data 
suggest ‘control of variables’ is not an advanced strategy, as predicted by the 
student model and supported by literature (Chen & Klahr, 1999), but using this 
strategy in advanced contexts makes an item more demanding. Overall, data 
demonstrated good alignment with the item difficulty pattern predicted by the 
student model. 
The pattern of ‘X’s in Figure 4 shows how students spread along the scale. 
Some used simple concepts only, having a 50% chance of getting EXP1 questions 
correct. Most used some measurement strategies correctly and started to 
manage uncertainty. Item EXP4 in Table 3 therefore represents accurately the 
reasoning characterising a majority of students in this group. Some, shown by 
the Xs higher up the map, showed advanced reasoning using higher level 
strategies in items testing complex ‘control of variables’. The highest scoring 
students found the most advanced question, EXP5_D, easy. The fact that mean 
value for students is higher than for items indicates that more difficult items in 
the scale were required. This would have helped characterise the most able 
students in more detail. The main outcome, however, is that the overall pattern is 
plausible compared to student and scoring models underpinning the scale, 
providing crucial evidence for the validity argument.  
Table 4 presents consistency statistics for the scale. These demonstrate 
good reliability and ‘fit statistics’: Bond and Fox (2001) recommend 1 as a 
desired value for Infit and Outfit, with no single item larger than 1.3 or lower 
than 0.7. All items were within this range.  
 
Table 4 
Summary statistics for Rasch analysis of experimenting scale 
 Person Item Total 
Mean Measure1 58.43 (14.28) 49.8 (12.00)  
Model Error 7.04 (1.06) 2.54 (0.53)  
Infit Mnsq 0.99 (0.42)  0.98 (0.16)  
Outfit Mnsq 1.00 (0.82) 1.00 (0.34)  
Separation 1.75 3.38  
Reliability  0.78 (Alpha) 0.95  
Variance explained 23.4 % 22.7 % 46.2 % 
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Figure 4. Item-person map for the experimenting scale. Each X to the left 
indicates the position of a student. Labels and callouts to the right indicate items. 
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Evidence evaluation 
Research literature on nature of science (NOS) and scientific 
argumentation was examined to help define the student model of reasoning as 
evidence evaluation using epistemic knowledge.  NOS literature reveals an 
ongoing debate about assessing functional understanding versus declarative 
statements (Allchin, 2011, p. 519). Allchin (ibid.) and Ford (2008) argue that 
expressing formal epistemology is insufficient for practical reasoning. Similarly, 
Sandoval (2005) points out that students may reason scientifically using 
different ideas from those they think scientists use, thus distinguishing between 
students’ knowledge about formal epistemology, and the practical, personal 
epistemology built through participating in school science inquiry. This study 
utilised formal epistemology to identify what ideas to assess, but made use of 
functional understanding and argumentation literature in considering how to 
assess. Formal epistemology emerges from science philosophers’, sociologists’ 
and historians’ attempts to establish normative models reflecting ‘best practice’ 
in science (Thagard, 1982), and are, therefore, the ‘correct answers’ for ideas 
educators want students to use in their reasoning. Applying these ideas meets 
G.J. Kelly and Duschl’s (2002) definition of epistemic practice, and is what the 
current scale intends to measure. 
Researchers have identified and agreeed on a set of formal 
epistemological ideas students ought to know (Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & 
Schwartz, 2002; J. Osborne, Ratcliffe, Collins, Millar, & Duschl, 2003). Driver et al. 
(1996) suggest three main categories: the purpose of scientific work, the nature 
and status of scientific knowledge and science as a social enterprise. Similarly, 
Sandoval (2005) suggests students should understand four themes in order to 
evaluate scientific claims in the context of socio-scientific issues: scientific 
knowledge is constructed; scientific methods are diverse; there are different 
forms of scientific knowledge; and scientific knowledge varies in certainty. Ideas 
from this literature and the notion of understanding criteria scientists use when 
evaluating theories (Sampson & Clark, 2008) served as guidance, and following 
ideas were selected for the scale: 
 
Understanding the claim-evidence relationship in science, e.g. 
- claim and evidence are different epistemic entities; 
- evidence is used in science to both support and reject claims; 
- science value empirical evidence, but this is not the only evidence 
being used when evaluating claims;  
- the credibility of the evidence is important to what conclusion can 
be drawn;  
- the relationship between claim and evidence is not always final, 
uncertainty and disagreement about their relationship may occur. 
Understanding criteria for evaluating and using evidence, e.g. 
- the significance of how evidence is obtained (i.e. if sufficient 
method, context, sample etc. were used); 
- the difference between anecdotal and scientific evidence;  
- the relevance of a theoretical rationale to explain the evidence; and 
- that an argument has to be presented for why an evidence is 
relevant to a claim. 
Understanding the role of personal and social contexts in evidence evaluation 
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and coordination, e.g. 
- that someone (person or group) may be biased towards their 
interests when using evidence; 
- that science operates as a social enterprise and collectively try to 
evaluate and coordinate evidence; and 
- that scientists may disagree in their interpretation of the claim-
evidence relationship.   
 
Information about progression in understanding and using evidence in 
science is sparse but growing. Research from NOS and scientific argumentation 
traditions were utilised. Erduran, Simon and J. Osborne (2004) suggest a five 
level scale for scoring quality of students’ scientific argumentation. At the lowest 
level, students meet claims with counter-claims rather than using evidence, 
suggesting they do not separate claim and evidence as different epistemic 
entities. At the middle levels, students use evidence to support a claim, with or 
without providing warrants and backings. This suggests increasing 
understanding of the need for an argument and for the scientific argument to be 
valid. At the highest levels, students bring in rebuttals, showing understanding 
that evidence can support an argument by questioning the counterclaim. Berland 
and McNeill (2010) outline a learning progression for scientific argumentation 
with a similar and more detailed account. Their progression scale starts with 
students understanding the need for using evidence to defend claims and, at the 
next levels, include increasingly advanced reasoning with absence or presence of 
argumentation components (data, warrants, backings and rebuttals). The highest 
level in their account, similar to that of Erduran and colleagues, involves using 
rebuttals in an argument.  Wilson (2005) offers a third approach, suggesting a 
‘using evidence’ construct, describing progression from having subjective 
perspective – providing subjective opinions, not understanding the value of 
evidence, to an scientific perspective – ‘questioning or justifying the source, 
validity, and/or quantity of evidence’ (p. 33).  
In NOS literature, general levels of epistemic development are 
identifiable. At the simplest level, students hold a naive positivist view that 
distinguishes little between describing and explaining nature, for example, an 
accurate observation is regarded as true knowledge. Driver et al. (1996) call this 
‘phenomenon-based reasoning’; Carey and C. Smith (1993) refer to ‘level 1 
epistemology’, while Lederman et al. (2002) use the term ‘naive epistemological 
views’.  Next, ‘intermediate’ level individuals show awareness of the possibility of 
multiple explanations for science phenomena, but may take extreme ‘positivist’ 
or ‘relativist’ views. For example, although many explanations exist, one may be 
regarded as ‘true’, or opposite, on the grounds that ‘no explanation is better than 
another’. Driver et al. call this stage ‘relation-based reasoning’; to Carey and C. 
Smith (op cit) this is ‘level 2’ reasoning, while  Lederman et al. describe this as ‘in 
transition’. The highest, ‘advanced’, level of understanding shows individuals 
accepting the model-like nature of scientific knowledge, replacing a ‘true – false’ 
perspective with use of supporting evidence. Driver et al. describe this as ‘model-
based-reasoning’, Lederman et al. call this ‘informed’ and Carey and C. Smith 
simply ‘level 3’. This development theme is similar to  psychological research on 
‘personal epistemology’ (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002; Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 
2000; Perry, 1970), which is found to be partly age related. Hence, general 
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development of students’ personal epistemology occurs across subject domains, 
interacting with development of epistemic understanding and reasoning in 
science. This ‘general’ literature suggests large proportions of individuals in 
older age-groups (adolescents and young adults) only partly reach the third, 
most advanced stage.  
Put together, literature suggests progression in students’ reasoning 
combines ‘epistemic growth’, that is, a general development towards better 
understanding of knowledge, with better understanding of science formal 
epistemology, and use of specific science epistemic ideas. ‘Naïve positivist’ 
students do not understand the need for a scientific argument, because they 
think ‘true’ claims emerge automatically from science data. These students, are 
likely to have little or no understanding of the quality of scientific evidence. Next, 
‘intermediate’ students accept multiple explanations and have some 
understanding about using evidence to support claims. These students are more 
likely than the positivists to understand that evidence has uncertainty and may 
or may not be a valid support to the claim. The most ‘informed’ students 
understand the modelling-like nature of science and the complicated 
relationship between claims and evidence. They understand the need for 
rebuttals when evaluating claims. Students, of course, are found along a 
continuum of this development.  
As in the experimenting scale, cognitive demand was considered. Students 
may show recognition of an epistemic idea, for example, that evidence has 
uncertainty, but be unable to apply this to complex problems requiring higher 
order thinking. Berland and McNeil (2010), however, point towards an opposite, 
equally relevant problem; that students may be able to reason scientifically, for 
example, being able to identify relevant evidence for a claim, but be unable to 
present an explicit, reasoned explanation. They suggest giving an explicit reason 
appears higher in the learning progression than using the knowledge. This aligns 
with Allchin’s (2011) suggestion that students develop functional epistemic 
understanding. Hence,  this was used as a progression criterion in the student 
model and transferred to the item and scoring models. 
Two items will be presented to illustrate operationalisation of the student 
model into item and scoring models, both based on J. Osborne and Ratcliffe 
(2002). The first item (EPI2 in Table5) had a socio-scientific setting and asked 
students to evaluate claims about the health risk of a chemical added to plastic. 
The item provided a list of seven pieces of information students could use as 
evidence, and asked specific questions about identifying evidence supporting or 
contradicting the claim, before asking for an overall conclusion. The ‘evidence 
list’ reflected the range of the ideas listed above about epistemic understanding, 
and included claims by the environmental lobbying group Greenpeace, technical 
information about tests and data, and outcomes from various research studies. 
From the student model, low-level reasoning was associated with responses 
selecting inappropriate information as evidence for the health risk, for example, 
using the Greenpeace claim. Medium-level reasoning related to understanding 
criteria for evaluating the evidence when identifying information contradicting 
the claim, for example, taking into consideration disagreement about research 
method. Two pieces of information supported the chemical not causing a health 
risk, giving an opportunity for two score levels. At the highest level, students 
synthesised all information to draw a conclusion. This took into consideration 
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synthesis of more information and weighing up of evidence on each side. Raw 
data are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
 Item (EPI2) in evidence evaluation scale. Stem above tables. 
 “Phthalates” are chemicals added in small amounts to plastic to make it soft and flexible. 
Scientists disagree about the effects these chemicals may have on humans’ health. Here is 
some information about phthalates: (list of information omitted) 
 
Use the information to answer the questions: 
A. What evidence supports that small amounts of phthalates could be dangerous 
to humans? 
  Frequency Percent Ability 
measure 
None correct 77 67.0 45.5 
Identify correct evidence  (1 pt) 38 33.0 55.4 
Total 115 100.0  
B. What evidence supports that small amounts of phthalates should not be 
dangerous to humans? 
  Frequency Percent Ability 
measure 
None correct  41 35.7 40.2 
One correct (1 pt) 61 53.0 52.7 
Two correct (2 pt) 13 11.3 57.3 
Total 115 100.0  
 
C. Which is the most correct conclusion, based on the information above? 
  Frequency Percent Ability 
measure 
Other conclusions (e.g. claim data  with uncertainty 
should not be used) 
56 48.7 42.3 
Small amounts of phthalates are most likely not to 
cause a health problem (1 pt) 
59 51.3 54.8 
Total 115 100.0  
 
 
The data (in Table 5) support the student and scoring models by 
demonstrating discrimination as predicted, that is, students with the highest 
level of reasoning on the item have highest total score on the test. Selecting 
Greenpeace’s claim as scientific evidence was a common error in question A 
among the lowest scoring students. In question C, high scoring students 
explained that the total weight of evidence supported the chemical not causing a 
health risk, while lower level students selected the wrong conclusion or that ‘you 
should never draw a conclusion when there is conflicting information’.  
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Table 6 
Item (EPI5) in evidence evaluation scale. Stem above tables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Evidence 1: Plants may grow and increase their weight in a glass of water. 
  Frequency Percent Ability 
measure 
None right (0 pt) 26 22.6 37.6 
Supports Laura (1 pt) 34 29.6 47.1 
Supports Laura contradicts Paul (2 pts) 49 42.6 54.0 
Supports Laura and Mary, because plant is in air 
and water (3 pts) 
6 5.2 63.6 
Total 115 100.0  
B. Evidence 2: Pot plants grow and increase their weight when you add water, 
but no soil disappears.  
  Frequency Percent Ability 
measure 
Wrong or none-response (0 pt) 51 44.3 39.3 
Supports Laura (1pt) 20 17.4 51.1 
Supports Laura and contradicts Paul (2 pt) 41 35.7 58.2 
Supports Laura and Mary, because plant is in air 
and is supplied with water (3 pt) 
3 2.6 65.0 
Total 115 100.0  
C. Evidence 3: If you weigh a growing pot plant you will find that the weight 
increases more than the water you add. 
  Frequency Percent Ability 
measure 
Wrong or none-response (0 pt) 58 50.4 42.7 
Supports Paul or Laura, because plant is in soil 
and you add water (1 pt) 
32 27.8 51.8 
Supports Mary, because mass must come from 
somewhere else than soil and water (2 pt) 
15 13.0 56.7 
Supports Mary (as above), but some mass still 
could come from water or soil (3pt) 
10 8.7 61.8 
Total 115 100.0  
 
 
The second item (EP15 in Table 6) asked students to coordinate claims 
and evidence regarding plant growth. This item differs from EPI2 (above) in that 
there is no ‘social’ element and therefore fewer perspectives to consider when 
drawing conclusions. There was, however, in question B and C, a longer line of 
reasoning needed, because evidence supported several claims and information 
could be regarded as evidence that was not mentioned in the text. For example, 
Three pupils are discussing how plants can increase in weight 
 
Paul says:  As a plant grows its extra weight comes from the soil 
Mary says:  The extra weight comes from the air 
Laura says:  The extra weight comes from the water the plant takes in 
through the roots 
 
They have 3 pieces of evidence for their argument. Say whose view(s) they support or 
contradict (there might be one or more). Explain why. 
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the plant is put in soil to which water is added, both variables being mentioned 
explicitly in the text, but the plant is also surrounded by air, which is implicit. 
The first trial showed some students answering what they thought was the ‘right’ 
claim without comparing claims and evidence. This risked getting the correct 
answer for the wrong reason. Asking students to explain their answer helped 
identify this problem, and brought the item into line with the student model. 
Including explanation significantly improved item discrimination and scale 
reliability between first and second iterations (see Table 1). The scoring model 
identified the wrong conclusion (students not connecting claim and evidence 
appropriately) as the lowest level, with a zero score. At the  next level students 
connected a mentioned piece of evidence (e.g. water or soil) and the claim 
appropriately, scoring 1 point. A third level (2 points) included students 
mentioning ‘rebuttals’ (the claim a piece of evidence would reject). The highest 
level (3 points) of reasoning related to building an argument with rebuttals and 
mentioning the ‘hidden’ variable (air).  As for the previous item, raw data in 
Table 6 gives positive evidence for this scoring model, showing that higher 
(theoretically) level responses relate to higher total scores on the test. 
 
Table 7 
Summary statistics for Rasch analysis of evidence evaluation scale 
 Person Item Total 
Mean Measure1 52.18 (11.70) 48.32 (13.70)  
Model Error 4.12 (0.94) 2.01 (0.74)  
Infit Mnsq 0.98 (0.17) 0.98 (0.17)  
Outfit Mnsq 0.97 (0.61) 0.97 (0.39)  
Separation 2.27 6.19  
Reliability  0.83 (Alpha) 0.97  
Variance explained 37.7 % 13.6 % 51.3 % 
 
 
Further evidence is obtained from the item-person map for items in the 
evidence evaluation scale (Figure 5). An unmistakable pattern supporting the 
theoretical predictions emerges. EPI4 asked students to distinguish between 
items in a list of ‘anecdotal’ and ‘scientific’ evidence, to identify evidence relevant 
to the claim ‘smoking is a health risk’. This was predicted as low level reasoning, 
because students had to evaluate the evidence only, not to co-ordinate this with a 
claim. Questions in the item occur at low end of Figure 5. Lowest ability students 
identified correctly that ‘statistics show smokers on average die at younger ages 
than non-smokers’ is valid evidence (EPI4C), but believed ‘a close friend or 
relative of yours has been smoking for a long time and has got ill’ (EPI4A) also 
counted as valid evidence. EPI1 asked students to evaluate if a claim could be 
tested scientifically, requiring understanding about the claim-evidence 
relationship. This is located in the mid area of the scale. All items including 
coordinating of claim and evidence (EPI2, EPI5 and EPI 7) are found towards the 
upper end of the scale. However, values on the left-hand scale in Figure 5 are 
average scores for each question. Threshold levels on the right of the item-
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person map are used in the scoring model for question A in EPI5, demonstrating 
that the simplest co-variation between claim and evidence (scoring 1 point in 
question A in EPI5) was an easier question handled by much lower ability level 
students. Mid-level students align with the second threshold (2 points), while the 
highest threshold (3 points, requiring identification of all covariant and non-
covariant variables) is placed higher than any student in the sample.  
Table 7 provides Rasch item statistics, showing the scale has appropriate 
infit/outfit, reliability and separation. About half of the variance was explained, a 
figure similar to that for the experimenting scale.  
 
Figure 5. Item-person map for evidence evaluation scale. Scale to the left shows 
average difficulty for questions. Scale to the right shows data for question A in 
Item EPI5 only.  
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Dimensionality of the scales 
Each of the three scales and the merged (total) scale were subjected to 
dimensionality analysis using ‘PCA of residuals’ in Winsteps.. The analysis 
examines if the scale is uni-dimensional by looking for patterns in variance not 
accounted for by Rasch measures. If truly uni-dimensional, no other significant 
factor in the unexplained variance should be present. Table 8 shows total 
variance in each scale (measured in Eigenvalue units and percent) and the 
explained and unexplained variances. If a second factor is significant, this should 
account for at least two eigenvalue units (Arrindell & van der Ende, 1985).  In 
Table 8, three (highlighted) values in the first contrast are above this level. The 
factors are referred to as ‘contrasts’, because the software separates items with 
positive and negative loadings. Table 9 shows loadings for each highlighted 
value. In the experimenting and evidence evaluation scales, factors are related to a 
contrast between items with high and low difficulty. In the total scale, the factor 
relates to a contrast between hypothesising versus experimentation and evidence 
evaluation. In all cases, however, eigenvalues for the factors are small, suggesting 
the scales are near uni-dimensional. The measure explains 77.8% of variance in 
the total scale, while the second factor explains just 4.2%. The conclusion is that 
the three subscales fit well into a single scale. Table 10 presents correlation 
values between the subscales, confirming that experimentation and evidence 
evaluation are more closely related than hypothesising and any scale. 
 
Table 8 
Rasch dimensionality analysis in Winsteps 
 Experimenting 
scale from 
items 
Evid.- Eval. scale 
from items  
Combined scale 
from items 
Combined 
scale from 
testlets 
 Eigen-
value 
Percent Eigen-
value 
Percent Eigen-
value 
Percent Eigen-
value 
Percent 
Total variance 24.1 100 39.0 100 49.4 100 22.7 100 
Explained by 
measures       
11.1 46.2 20.0 51.3 23.3 47.4 15.7   69.2          
Unexplained 
Variance  
13.0   53.8 19.0 48.7 26.0 52.6   7.0 30.8  
1st contrast 2.6 10.9 2.9 7.5 2.9 6.0 1.7 7.3  
2nd contrast 1.8 7.4 1.9 5.4 2.5 5.2 - -  
3rd contrast 1.5 6.2 1.7 4.5 2.2 4.5 - - 
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Table 9 
Item loadings to secondary dimensions in Combined scale 
1st contrast 2nd Contrast  3RD Contrast 
Item Loading Item Loading Item Loading 
      
Positive      
EXP1C .58 EXP1A .59 EPI5B .62 
EXP1A .57 EPI4H .51 EPI5C .44 
EXP1B .56 EXP1C .47 EPI5A .35 
EXP1F .54 EXP1B .46 EPI4E .32 
EXP1D .49 EPI2B .45 EPI4B .28 
      
Negative      
EPI4I -.51 EPI5C -.52 EXP5D -.43 
EPI4H -.49 EPI2C -.45 EXP1E -.42 
EPI7B -.44 EPI5A -.37 EXP1D -.42 
EPI4F -.40 EXP5D -.32 EXP4B -.42 
EPI4D -.39 EPI2B -.26 EXP5B -.39 
 
 
Table 10 
Correlation table for the three scales 
 Experimenting Evidence 
Evaluation 
Science 
Conceptual 
Understanding 
Experimenting 1 0.69** 0.60** 
Evidence evaluation  1 0.59** 
Sc. Concept. Underst.   1 
. ** Significant to 0.01 level. 
 
 
Discussion 
Two aims of the current paper have been to establish construct-driven 
assessment in science and to improve assessment of scientific reasoning. It 
commenced with a particular disciplinary rationale, suggesting scientific 
reasoning relates to the three practices, hypothesising, experimenting and 
evidence evaluation, and requires understanding of science conceptual, 
procedural and epistemic knowledge (Author & Colleagues, In review). From this 
rationale, the paper has followed Kane’s (2006) suggestion of ‘validity as 
argument’, trying to build a line of reasoning that combines Mislevy et al.’s 
(2002) student models, item models, scoring models and measurement models and 
incorporates Wilson’s (2005) ‘developmental perspective’. Because assessment 
informs construct understanding (Bond, 2003), a third aim has been to explore 
and improve the theoretical rationale. 
Looking at sub-scales for measuring experimenting and evidence 
evaluation, the analysis has placed student models in the context of 
epistemological growth from ‘naïve positivism’ towards ‘informed relativism’ 
(Perry, 1970). Students, it seems, become better positioned to learn science and 
to learn about science as their personal epistemology matures, but may also 
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develop their personal epistemology from science learning (C. L. Smith, Maclin, 
Houghton, & Hennessey, 2000). The development has importance to scientific 
reasoning, because science is an epistemic practice requiring an informed 
relativist epistemology (Kelly and Duschl, 2002). Science practice, however, and 
thereby the experimenting and evidence evaluation scales, relates to specific 
conceptual, procedural and epistemic ideas within the generic personal 
epistemological development. The epistemological growth described by Perry, 
therefore, serves as a frame that helps identify levels of progression in the scales, 
but does not inform about the ideas needed at each level. In evidence evaluation, 
for example, students have to understand particular criteria for evaluating 
claims and evidence, and in experimenting they have to learn measurements and 
strategies for testing hypotheses. This understanding is parallel to 
understanding science conceptual knowledge, for example, undergoing 
conceptual change (C. L. Smith et al., 2000) and including misconceptions 
(Lubben & Millar, 1996) 
Following from these perspectives, the validity argument in the current 
study has been based on identifying relevant epistemic and procedural ideas, and 
demonstrating how these ideas relate to progression levels informed by the 
overall growth in students’ personal epistemology. Thereafter, both of these, i.e. 
the epistemic and procedural ideas and the progression levels, have been related 
to assessment items and scoring criteria. Constructing the validity argument for 
experimenting and evidence evaluation has been possible because of the wide 
range of research literature studying teaching and learning of the nature of 
science, scientific inquiry, and scientific argumentation. The scale for hypothesising 
has not been outlined in the same way, but the idea that this practice is 
knowledge-based is already established and applied in content-led science tests. 
What the current rationale adds, however, is a stronger focus on progression and 
the involvement of epistemic and procedural knowledge. Learning progression 
research for conceptual knowledge is more comprehensive than for procedural 
and epistemic knowledge (e.g. Alonzo & Steedle, 2009; M. Wilson, 2009), and 
therefore suggests a similar argument as carried out for experimenting and 
evidence evaluation could be presented for hypothesising. 
A challenging issue in the validity argument has been the role of domain-
general reasoning abilities. On one hand, the current paper rests on a claim that 
domain-general cognition has been too dominant in teaching and assessment of 
scientific reasoning and seeks an alternative rationale related to the three types 
of domain-specific knowledge. On the other hand, general cognition plays an 
obvious role that has to be accounted for. The solution in the current study has 
been to relate domain-general reasoning to a third ‘progression dimension’, 
adding to the knowledge and practices dimensions in Figure 2. Progression, as 
shown in Figure 3, is explained as increasing complexity of domain-specific 
knowledge combined with increasing levels of domain-general reasoning (from 
lower to higher-order thinking). This has resemblance to the two-dimensional 
Tyler-Bloom ‘content-behaviour’ grid (Bloom, Hastings, & Madaus, 1971), 
commonly used in assessment. However, adding procedural and epistemic 
knowledge, rather than just science conceptual knowledge, and looking towards 
progression in understanding each of these make important differences. In the 
Tylor-Bloom rationale, for example as it is applied in the TIMSS science 
framework (Figure 1), experimenting and evidence evaluation become ‘skills’ and 
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related to ‘cognitive demand’. The current rationale, in contrast, makes the same 
practices a matter of understanding of procedural and epistemic knowledge. 
One outcome from the scale development that sheds light on the 
relationship between domain-general reasoning and domain-specific knowledge 
is that these tend to be more separated in lower than higher progression areas. 
In the higher areas, knowledge and general reasoning are mixed and make it 
harder to tell what exactly is being measured. For example, a low level item 
asking students to identify what information can be used as scientific evidence to 
support a claim tests specific epistemic knowledge about criteria for scientific 
evidence. In contrast, a higher order item asking students to draw a conclusion 
by synthesising and analysing a series of measurement, taking into consideration 
uncertainty and anomalous data, is much more complex. Students have to use 
epistemic and procedural knowledge, but the domain-general reasoning is more 
demanding and naturally will have stronger impact. It was also noticed during 
item development that ‘advanced’ items in evidence evaluation, asking students 
to coordinate claim and evidence, are similar to ‘advanced’ items in 
experimenting, asking students to draw a conclusion from interpreting data. In 
other words, the two scales seem to ‘merge’ in the higher progression areas both 
because of a stronger influence of domain-general higher order thinking 
(synthesis and analysis) and by items involving the same procedural, epistemic 
and conceptual knowledge. These issues have implication for dimensionality in 
the scales, and may partly explain the findings in Table 8. In a previous study, 
author and colleagues (Author & Colleagues, 2011) investigated students’ 
reasoning in practical laboratory tasks and found hypothesising, experimenting, 
and evidence evaluation appearing as more distinct practices. It is therefore some 
reason to believe the test format in the current study (using written tests) has 
contributed to ‘merging’ the three types of reasoning and also made domain-
general reasoning more dominant. 
The current study has several implications. It underlines the importance 
of separating and clarifying the involved dimensions in any science assessment 
in order to increase the emphasis on scientific reasoning. Existing assessment 
practices tend to associate scientific reasoning with domain-general reasoning, 
and even if there has been a long call for making the reasoning ‘domain-specific’ 
and ‘knowledge-based’ (Zeineddin & Abd-El-Khalick, 2010) these aims have not 
been widely implemented. The TIMSS study has been used as an example, using a 
framework (Martin et al., 2008) that associates scientific reasoning with 
‘cognitive demand’ rather than ‘science content’. By producing scales for 
different levels of cognitive demands, TIMSS broadcasts a message that scientific 
reasoning is higher-order, domain-general reasoning. Introducing procedural 
and epistemic knowledge dimensions into the framework, in a similar way as 
science conceptual knowledge, therefore, makes a way forward for changing this 
framework. Similar notes can be made about the NAEP and Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) science assessments. The NAEP science 
framework (National Assessment Governing Board, 2008) includes procedural 
and epistemic knowledge embedded in science performance. This is the line 
supported in the current study, but the dimensions have to be categorised 
explicitly, which is not a case in NAEP. The PISA framework (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006) separates between knowledge 
of science and knowledge about science, and also categorises both of these. The 
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framework, however, avoids explaining how procedural and epistemic 
knowledge link to specific elements of scientific reasoning. It is a categorisation 
of formal epistemology learned for ‘scientific literacy’ rather than epistemic 
knowledge used in reasoning. The current study suggests both frameworks have 
to identify particular procedural and epistemic ideas associated with scientific 
reasoning and also describe progression of such ideas.  
The study also has implications for classroom teaching and assessment, 
again suggesting that all three practices and all three types of knowledge should 
be made explicit. As the study has illustrated, this does not mean that science 
teachers explicitly should teach science philosophy, but rather that students 
should learn to apply rules and criteria in the different science practices. The 
solution, in the current study, is to clarify what specific epistemic ideas students 
have to learn and then operationalise these into items and scoring criteria. The 
same applies to teaching; teachers have to understand the procedural and 
epistemic ideas and then ‘operationalise’ these into examples used for students. 
Assessment in this way can be applied as a tool illustrating to teachers and 
students what the ideas are and how they apply in scientific reasoning.  
The study has limitations, particularly because of its small scale and for 
looking at a limited set of procedural and epistemic ideas. The main outcome is 
therefore establishing a line of reasoning that can be extended and investigated 
more thoroughly in further research. This line of reasoning fits well with existing 
construct-driven assessment in  Milsevy et al. (2003) and Wilson (2005), and 
with the emphasise on functional understanding by Allchin (2011), but suggests 
more effort should be made to include and specify in more details all three 
practices and all three types of knowledge listed in the current rationale for 
scientific reasoning. Besides, the population discussed in the current paper is 
lower secondary, with little attention paid towards primary or upper secondary 
years. Expanding future research, within the same rationale, in both these 
directions seems plausible and may add valuable new information. 
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